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NONFIRM ENERGY AND BPA'S INDUSTRIAL
CUSTOMERS
Eric Redman*
A power system's purpose is to meet electric loads. For most loads in
the United States, this purpose is achieved by building generating re-
sources to provide "firm" power. Firm power is power intended to be
available continuously, or power whose availability can be assured. I The
rule is that a system plans to have, and is obligated to have, enough firm
power to meet all its loads. 2
The chief exception, regionally and nationally, is twenty-five percent
of the load of the direct-service industrial ("DSI") customers 3 of the
Bonneville Power Administration ("BPA").4 Instead of planning firm
power generating resources to serve this portion of the DSI load (the DSI
"top quartile" or "first quartile"), BPA uses a combination of two other
resources: nonfirm energy, availability of which is not assured, and firm
* Member of Heller, Ehrman, White & McAuliffe (Seattle); A.B., 1970, Harvard College;
B.A., 1972 and M.A., 1980, Oxford University; J.D., 1975, Harvard Law School. Since 1975, the
author has represented the direct-service industrial (DSI) customers of the Bonneville Power Admin-
istration (BPA) in matters relating to electric power supply, rates, legislation, and litigation. The
views expressed in this article are those of the author and not necessarily those of his clients. The
author extends particular thanks to Hector J. Durocher, the former Power Manager of BPA, for his
extensive assistance on all technical aspects of this article. Brett E. Wilcox and Larry G. Hittle made
useful criticisms. Sherril Holechek provided technical assistance. The author is responsible for any
errors that remain.
1. BONNEViLLE POwER ADMINISTRATION, BPA DEFINMONs 29 (June 1981) [hereinafter cited as
BPA DERNmONS].
2. To provide reliable firm power service, power systems must also maintain reserves, i.e.,
sources of power that can be drawn upon to protect service during periods of shortage or equipment
failure. See Cohen, Efficiency and Competition in the Electric-Power Industry, 88 YALE L.J. 1511,
1514-15 (1979). See also 16 U.S.C. § 839a(17) (Supp. V 1981) (defining BPA "reserves").
3. Currently 14 DSIs operate some 18 facilities in the Northwest which produce or process about
30% of the nation's primary aluminum, all of the nation's domestically-mined nickel, and substantial
quantities of other metals and chemicals. The term "direct-service" reflects that these companies buy
their power directly from BPA (which is otherwise a wholesale supplier) rather than from a utility.
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Supply and Conservation Act: Hearings on S. 2080 Before the
Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 92-93 (1978) (statement of
Gordon C. Culp, counsel, Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee).
4. The Bonneville Power Administration is a federal power marketing agency that sells federally-
generated power and power it acquires from nonfederal sources pursuant to the Bonneville Project
Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. §§ 832-837 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), the Federal Columbia RiverTransmis-
sion System Act of 1974, 16 U.S.C. § 838 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839 (Supp. V 1981), and other laws. BPA's
primary service territory is defined by statute and basically includes Idaho, Oregon, Washington,
Montana west of the continental divide, and those portions of Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming that are
within the Columbia River drainage basin. 16 U.S.C. § 839a(14) (Supp. V 1981).
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energy "borrowed" from future time periods at the DSI's risk. 5 This
"combination service" makes the DSI top quartile unique, both opera-
tionally and legally. 6
There are several reasons why BPA uses combination service rather
than firm power service to meet the DSI top quartile demand: (1) if prop-
erly designed, combination service can provide adequate power quality
for this portion of the DSI demand; (2) environmental impacts and costs
to non-DSI consumers would be greater if firm resources, planned and
installed for other loads, were increased by the amount of the DSI top
quartile;7 and (3) although combination service imposes costs on the DSIs
in the form of periodic interruptions, it saves money for all BPA custom-
ers by permitting BPA to take advantage of certain physical features of
the Columbia River power system that would otherwise impede rather
than facilitate efficiency.
5. See infra note 27.
6. Although the concept of a DSI "top quartile load" is used for simplicity throughout this pa-
per, in fact each DSI's load is indivisible; i.e., there are no distinct "top quartile" facilities, employ-
ees, or products. The DSI "quartiles" are actually portions of each DSI's contract demand for Indus-
trial Firm Power from BPA, rather than discrete segments of load. See, e.g., Final Action
Concerning Power Sales and Residential Exchange Contracts Required by Pacific Northwest Electric
Power, Planning and Conservation Act, 46 Fed. Reg. 44,340, 44,379 (1981) (prototype power sales
contract, Attachment 2) [hereinafter cited as 1981 DSI Contracts].
7. This amount would be equivalent to an additional nuclear power plant. DSI contract demands
currently total some 3600 megawatts. The top quartile is thus about 900 megawatts. To provide this
energy on a firm basis would require the equivalent of a 1200 megawatt nuclear power plant (such as
Washington Public Power Supply System Nuclear Project No. 1) operated at a 75% plant factor. As
the Administrator of BPA explained to a Congressional committee in 1980:
First, as you know, the DSI's receive a mixture of firm and nonfirm power, unlike other BPA
customers. Half the energy and all of the capacity associated with the DSI loads may be inter-
rupted or withdrawn by BPA under certain circumstances to meet the firm power needs of other
customers .... As a result, only about half the DSI power could even theoretically be used by
utilities for serving the loads of other types of customers, including load growth. The other
nonfirm half of the DSI load represents reserves that the region would have to carry in some
form in any event. In the absence of the DSIs, it might be difficult for BPA and the region to
earn equivalent revenues from the sale of this reserve capacity and energy. Thus, while the DSI
firm load represents roughly 1.7 large new conventional power plants, the fact that the DSI
power is nonfirm saves the region the need for another 1.7 conventional power plants of the
same size (or their equivalent). This is one reason why from a rate impact standpoint, it is
beneficial for other consumers that the DSIs are part of the regional power system in the North-
west.
Letter from Administrator Sterling S. Munro to Hon. Abraham B. Kazen, Aug. 19, 1980, at 6-7,
reprinted in 17 BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, RECORD OFTHE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINIS-
TRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY PROPOSED 1981 TRANSMISSION AND WHOLESALE POWER RATES
9499-505 [hereinafter cited as RATES RECORD] and 8 BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, CON-
TRACT OFFICIAL RECORDS 198 1, at 2334-40 [hereinafter cited as CONTRACT OFFICIAL RECORDS].
The statement cited refers also to the DSI second quartile, service to which is not discussed here.
BPA plans firm power resources to support service to the DSI second quartile, but retains rights to
interrrupt delivery of power to the second quartile that render such service "nonfirm" in the sense
used above.
Nonfirm Energy
These policy reasons are simple; the operational details ofcombihation
service are not. Because combination service is complex it is poorly un-
derstood, and the cost savings it provides the Northwest are in danger of
being lost. This article attempts to explain combination service, its opera-
tional mechanics and policy justifications, its historical evolution and its
new statutory basis. The article has four basic sections:
(1) An operational and policy explanation focusing on the physical fea-
tures of the BPA system that make combination service efficient and per-
mit BPA to use a form of "average water" planning rather than "critical
water" planning not just to make rates but also to meet loads. 8 This sec-
tion includes analysis of nonfirm energy and its uses, as well as analysis
of reservoir operating techniques that "borrow" DSI firm energy from
future periods for current use.
(2) An historical explanation, showing the evolution of DSI service and
the problems encountered under the DSI contracts of the 1960's and early
1970's. While BPA has long used forms of combination service for some
portion of the loads of some DSIs, other DSIs formerly enjoyed firm ser-
vice for their entire loads. Only with the Industrial Firm contracts of 1975
did BPA develop the concept of quartiles, a uniform industrial sales pol-
icy, and a clear form of combination service.
(3) A legislative explanation, showing how Congress in ,1980 contin-
ued and refined the form of combination service provided to the DSI top
quartile; how this form of combination service deals with problems en-
countered under earlier contracts; and how combination service is now
integrated into statutory provisions governing not just BPA power supply
obligations, but all BPA rates.
(4) A discussion of recent litigation, examining briefly the recent deci-
sion in Central Lincoln Peoples' Utility District v. Johnson ("Central
Lincoln 1"), 9 which deals directly with BPA's use of nonfirm energy for
service to the DSIs.
8. Under pure "critical water" planning concepts, BPA would plan to serve, and to recover all
its costs from, only those loads that could be met with the power produced under the lowest or near-
lowest streamflow conditions on historical record. The DSI top quartile service explained in this
article permits BPA to plan instead on serving and collecting revenue from a larger total load, i.e., a
load that can be met when streamflows exceed "critical" and approach average levels. Under aver-
age streamflow conditions, as explained below, BPA can meet all its loads including the DSI top
quartile, at least if all power is used first to meet loads and not diverted to other purposes until all
loads are met.
9. 673 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir.), amended, 686 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted. 51
U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1983) (No. 82-1071).
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I. NONFIRM ENERGY AND RELATED RESERVOIR
OPERATIONS
A. Nonfirm Energy and Features of the Hydro System
Nonfirm energy is energy that is not continuously available or energy
whose availability cannot be assured. 10 Its availability cannot be assured
on a hydroelectric system such as the BPA's because a hydro system uses
water for fuel. Historical records tell planners the minimum ("critical")
amount of water nature has provided in prior years. Planners calculate the
firm energy which the system can produce by assuming that at least this
critical amount of water will be available in each future year. "1 Firm en-
ergy is thus the energy that can be produced under critical water condi-
tions. Nonfirm energy is energy produced from "extra" water when na-
ture makes it available. It is often described technically as energy
produced on a hydro system by above-critical water conditions. 12
Nonfirm energy is unavailable when streamflows approximate the low-
est or near-lowest volumes recorded for a period of similar duration-the
circumstance in which streamflow or runoff is said to be critical. Under
10. BPA DEFINITIONS, supra note 1, at 45.
11. See Bonneville Power Administration, Agreement for the Coordination of Operations
Among Power Systems of the Pacific Northwest §§ 2(p), 6 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Coordination
Agreement]. As BPA explains:
One of the first steps in preparing the annual operating plan is to determine the "critical pe-
riod" for the Coordinated System. The critical period is defined as that portion of the historical
40-year streamflow record which, when combined with draft of all available reservoir storage,
will produce the least amount of energy, with the energy shaped to the seasonal load pattern. All
reservoirs are assumed to be full at the beginning of the critical period and [will be drafted] to be
empty at the end. The critical period for the Coordinated System for the 1975-76 operating year
was determined by the streamflows which occurred during the 43 1/2-month period between
August 15, 1928 and March 31, 1932.
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION. THE ROLE OF THE BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION IN THE
PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM. INCLUDING ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE HYDRO-THERMAL
POWER PROGRAM, Appendix A, at 11-34 (July 22, 1977) (Draft Environmental Impact Statement)
[hereinafter cited as DEIS].
In other words, the system's firm energy is that which could be produced in 43-1/2 months if
1928-1932 streamftows recur and if reservoirs, starting full, are drafted to mud (a 42-1/2 month
period has since replaced the 43-1/2 month period used in 1975-1976). Tempering the apparent con-
servatism of such assumptions is that if 1928-1932 flows do recur, the system will be completely
"bust" after 42-1/2 months. There is also no guarantee that nature will provide flows as great as those
of the 1928-1932 period; it would be a happy coincidence if the lowest possible flows happened to
have occurred during the relatively short time in which streamflow records have been kept.
12. The term "secondary" energy is today often used interchangeably with "nonfirm" energy.
What is now called "firm" energy was originally called "primary firm" energy. Secondary energy
referred to energy whose production was assured under critical water conditions (unlike nonfirm en-




critical conditions, all hydro energy is firm energy, not nonfirm energy. 13
Because streamflows have other power and nonpower uses, nonfirm en-
ergy may not be available even when streamflows exceed critical. But
when nonfirm energy is available at all it tends to be available in substan-
tial quantities; it has a feast or famine (deluge or drought?) pattern of
availability, particularly from season to season but also from year to year.
BPA's nonfirm energy production and sales policies reflect six basic
physical facts of the region's hydroelectric system:
(1) Variations in annual streamflows are immense. On the Coumbia
River System, the highest recorded annual flows greatly exceed average
flows, and average flows greatly exceed critical flows. 14 Moreover, an-
nual runoff volume during the BPA system's July 1-June 30 operating
year is entirely random and cannot be predicted until the January
snowpack survey' 5 at the earliest. This means the operating year is al-
ready half over by the time planners can intelligently guess whether the
year will produce critical, average, or abundant streamflows. The poten-
tial for large but unpredictable flows above critical means that unless mar-
kets can be found for large but nondependable quantities of nonfirm en-
ergy, water will often be wasted, revenues lost, and all BPA rates
increased unnecessarily. 16
(2) On BPA's system, seasonal flow variation is also immense.
Seasonal variations in snow, rain, and runoff are typical of hydro sys-
tems. But on the Columbia River, the runoff peaks in late spring and sum-
mer, the "wrong" time in relation to the region's demand for power,
which peaks in winter. 17 Thus, nonfirm energy is almost never available
13. Firm energy, in fact, is defined as the energy the system is capable of producing under criti-
cal water conditions. See supra note I and accompanying text.
14. Minimum annual runoff volume on the Columbia is 78 million acre feet (MAF), average is
135 MAF, and maximum is 193 MAF. DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-12; Columbia River
Water Management Group, Depletions Task Force, Adjusted Streamflow and Storage 1928-1978
(Oct. 1981) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). (Like those in the latter paper, the
numbers in the DEIS represent thousands of cubic feet per second, but are labeled incorrectly; con-
verted to MAF they yield the figures in this footnote.)
15. At the beginning of each month, January through June, Northwest reservoir operators pre-
pare forecasts of each reservoir's refill probability based on spring runoff and other available climato-
logical data. The principal snowpack survey for the BPA system is that undertaken by the U.S. Soil
Conservation Service, whose first report is generally available on January 10. In most years, little of
the Columbia River Basin's annual precipitation accumulates as snowpack prior to January.'For the
relationship between the volume runoff forecasts and development of the "variable energy content
curve" on which nonfirm energy sales are based, see DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-40.
16. The revenue BPA expects to collect from nonfirm energy sales under average water condi-
tions is used to reduce prospectively the rates it sets for firm power. Put another way, in setting rates
BPA spreads part of its costs over the total sales it expects to make under average rather than critical
water conditions. See, e.g., Bonneville Power Administration, Summary Rate Design Study (Feb.
1981), reprinted in I RATEs RECORD, supra note 7, at 320-22.
17. On average, natural runoff on the Columbia River is about five times as great in June as in
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in fall and early winter. 18 If generated solely in response to natural
streamflows, nonfirm energy would rarely be available until late spring or
early summer, when it would often be too abundant to be used com-
pletely. If the system serves a year-round load in part with nonfirm en-
ergy, it must therefore serve the load with other energy in the fall and
early winter. For the system to maximize efficiency and minimize spilled
water, 19 it must also (a) operate its storage reservoirs to capture and hold
as much of the natural streamflow as possible, 20 and (b) rely on snowpack
surveys to predict future runoff so that generation of nonfirm energy can
begin even before the natural runoff arrives, thus creating storage space in
reservoirs and lengthening the portion of the year during which nonfirm
energy is available. 21
(3) Storage capacity on the Columbia is small in relation to average
runoff. On the Colorado River system, for example, there is reservoir
storage capacity for 386% of the average annual streamflow. 22 This per-
mits runoff to be "smoothed out." No water is spilled and, more impor-
tant, all water available for power production can be used to produce firm
power. On the Columbia storage is only about thirty percent of average
annual streamflow. 23 While even this limited storage increases BPA's
firm power capability, flows often remain uncontrolled, producing non-
firm energy that saturates all markets and forcing some water to spill.
Techniques that increase effective storage capacity thus reduce spills and
increase efficiency. 24
(4) Northwest streamflows above critical are used for purposes besides
power and for power purposes besides nonfirm. Fish passage, recreation,
flood control, navigation and irrigation all limit power generation. 25 And
December; nearly two-thirds of the average annual runoff occurs in the four-month period of April
through July. L. Dean, Understanding Hydroelectric Power System Critical Periods 5 & table I (Feb.
1982) (paper prepared for the Bonneville Power Administration) (copy on file with the Washington
Law Review). The lowest recorded daily flow (35,000 cubic feet per second ("cfs")) occurred on
January 12, 1937; the highest daily flow (1,240,000 cfs) was nearly 3600% greater, and occurred on
June 4, 1894. INTERNATIONAL COLUMBIA RIVER ENGINEER BOARD, WATER RESOURCES OFTHE COLUM-
BIA RIVER BASIN 53-57 (1959). Primarily because of heating loads, regional demand peaks in mid-
January when streamflow is at its lowest. DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-36, figure 11-4.
18. December, 1982, provided an exception. In one of the wettest Decembers ever, BPA found
itself forced to sell nonfirm energy to Southwest utilities at a "spill" rate.
19. For an explanation of the "spilled water" concept, see infra part ICI.
20. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
21. DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-40.
22. Id. Appendix A, at II-12.
23. L. Dean, supra note 17, at 9. Until 1970, Columbia River storage was less than half this
amount. Id.
24. The rules of reservoir operation for production of firm power "frequently [restrict) the ability
• . . to produce nonfirm energy" and "there is a high probability that water will be spilled." DEIS,
supra note I1, Appendix A, at 11-42, 11-43.
25. For example, a new fish and wildlife program for the Columbia River and its tributaries is
Vol. 58:279, 1983
Nonfirm Energy
regardless of runoff volumes, water available for power generation is
used first to maintain reservoirs at levels sufficient to meet the system's
future firm load and, if possible, to refill the reservoirs. 26 In addition,
when nonfirm energy is finally produced, it has two distinct uses: to serve
directly a load that lacks a source of firm power or to substitute for ("dis-
place") firm power already being used to serve another load. Thus, the
actual availability of nonfirm energy, unlike firm energy, for any particu-
lar use cannot be determined more than a few months in advance, and
then only in the spring.
(5) The use of nonfirm energy directly in the DSI load without a firm
power resource installed for backup depends on, and is necessary to make
possible, the "borrowing" of DSI firm energy from future time periods.
This borrowing is performed by drafting reservoirs deeply in the fall and
winter, thus producing firm energy from water that would otherwise be
held to produce firm energy in a later season or year, 27 a technique that in
most years reduces spills by increasing the storage space available in res-
ervoirs prior to the spring runoff. In combination with nonfirm energy
available in other seasons, these firm energy borrowing techniques used
in the fall and winter can maintain nearly continuous service to the DSI
top quartile 28 and can substantially reduce spills caused by lack of storage
capacity. The interdependence of DSI nonfirm energy and borrowed firm
energy in serving the DSI top quartile is often overlooked; use of each
makes use of the other necessary and possible. 29
(6) The efficiency of Northwest hydropower operations depends in part
on the size of the region's nighttime load. Because of environmental con-
straints, river flow cannot be shut off during hours when demand for
expected to reduce firm power capability by an average of some 550 megawatts, an amount roughly
equivalent to the output of one unit at the Centralia, Washington coal plant. NORTHWEST POWER
PLANNING COUNCIL, FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM § 304(a)(4), at 3-6 (Nov. 15, 1982).
26. The first (power) use of water is to restore reservoirs; nonfirm energy is generated if reservoir
levels are above the level needed to assure future service to firm loads. Coordination Agreement,
supra note 11, at § 9(h); DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-12 to -13.
27. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., Ist. Sess. 59 (1979) (projecting 96% average availa-
bility of power for total DSI load through use of such techniques in the absence of a regional firm
energy deficit, equivalent to 84% average availability of power for DSI top quartile under such condi-
tions).
29. The region could in theory develop other loads (e.g., boilers, irrigation, etc.) suited to direct
use of nonfirm energy on a seasonal basis. This concept is being actively explored as a possible
additional market for nonfirm energy during the spring and summer. See, e.g., Northwest Power
Planning Council, Regional Retail Secondary Markets Background Memorandum (1982) (Staff pa-
per) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). But because a purely seasonal nonfirm load
provides by definition no year-round firm load whose later curtailment can secure a "borrowing" of
firm energy in the fall, it cannot make possible the reservoir operating techniques that reduce spills.
See infra part ID.
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power drops. The DSI load is large and operates around the clock. A
large nighttime load permits minimum streamflows to be met with water
that is used to generate power and earn revenue. The alternative methods
of meeting minimum streamflow constraints would be to spill water at
night or to further limit BPA's daytime sales of peaking power (capacity)
to utilities. 30 BPA's capacity sales help utilities avoid the need to install
more generators in order to meet their peak loads, but such sales require
BPA to accept return of energy from the utilities at night. This reduces the
nighttime demand on BPA's hydro system which conflicts with maintain-
ing flows. Loss of nighttime load thus means loss of firm power and loss
of revenues. 31 The DSI top quartile represents a far greater proportion of
the region's nighttime than daytime load. 32 If the top quartile is not
served by day-that is, if neither nonfirm energy nor "borrowed" DSI
firm energy is available for this purpose-it cannot be served at night,
since the load cannot readily be switched on and off.33 If the top quartile
is not served at night, the region will lose energy and revenues through
30. DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix C, at 11-28:
Except for the curtailment of nonfirm power, the load factor of [a DSI] plant might be 99
percent all year long. This high load factor service is extremely important to Bonneville because
it enhances the ability to accept peaking return energy at night. Without the industry load,
streamflow constraints would not allow Bonneville to sell as much peaking power as it now
does.
A brief example of BPA's sales of peaking power and associated returns of energy may be helpful
in understanding this point. A utility whose peak load exceeds the maximum output of its own power
plants by 1000 kilowatts for one hour each day may obtain the extra capacity it needs by scheduling
1000 kilowatts from BPA for that peak hour only. During one or more off-peak hours, when the
output of the utility's power plants exceeds the utility's loads, the utility can return the energy-I 000
kilowatt-hours-to BPA. BPA uses this energy to serve its nighttime load and stores in reservoirs
water it would otherwise have used to produce energy to meet that load. The utility has thus obtained
1000 kilowatts of added peaking power, and BPA has the same amount of energy available as it did
before the transaction-provided it can accept the return energy while continuing to meet minimum
streamflows.
31. Loss of nighttime load may also require reduction in the nighttime power output of the re-
gions's coal and nuclear plants. Such plants operate most efficiently, however, on a round-the-clock
basis. Moreover, most of their costs are capital costs (not fuel costs) which continue and must be
recovered whether the plants are operating or not. For this reason, a combined thermal and hydro-
power system operates most efficiently in pure economic terms when thermal plants operate around
the clock to meet continuous loads and hydropower sources are shaped to follow fluctuating loads.
See generally DEIS, supra note 11, at Part 1 11-7 to -17 (discussing BPA's Hydro-Thermal Power
Program).
32. A 900 megawatt DSI top quartile load, see supra note 7, represents less than 6% of BPA's
1982 peak daytime generation (about 15,500 megawatts) but 30% of BPA's 1982 minimum nighttime
generation (about 3,000 megawatts). Similarly, a 900 megawatt top quartile load as a percentage of
the Northwest Power Pool's 1982 minimum nighttime load (about 16,000 megawatts) is more than
twice as great as its percentage of the Pool's 1982 peak daytime load (about 37,000 megawatts).
Letter from Hector Durocher recording notes on conversation with Don Baldrica, BPA Division of
Power Resources (Dec. 20, 1982) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
33. See infra note 50.
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spills, increase thermal peaking capacity, operate existing thermal plants
less efficiently, or all of these, just to meet remaining loads. Other night-
time loads also provide nighttime benefits but at the cost to the region of
installing firm resources (new generators) for the daytime service of such
loads. No such resources are installed for the daytime service of the DSI
top quartile.
These six physical features of the regional power system have shaped
BPA's nonfirm energy policies, reservoir operations, and DSI service.
The DSI top quartile has evolved into a load served: (a) primarily with
nonfirm energy, some of which would otherwise not be sold;34 (b) in part
through firm energy borrowing techniques that reduce spills by increasing
the system's effective reservoir storage capacity; 35 (c) without firm power
resources being planned or installed for this purpose;36 and (d) at night in
a manner that helps the system meet environmental requirements without
spilling water and losing revenue. Although these particular efficiencies
cannot currently be achieved by other uses of nonfirm energy, nonfirm
energy does have another use, discussed immediately below.
B. The Two Uses of Nonfirm Energy
Nonfirm energy has two basic uses, only one of which is discussed
above. The second use is to displace (substitute for) the firm power output
of a generating resource such as a coal plant or a combustion turbine.
Initially, displacement may be physical (a generator planned for service
to firm loads is shut down, and nonfirm energy is used to serve the load
instead) or economic (the generator continues to operate, but the output is
"displaced" and sold as nonfirm energy to another entity that has a gen-
erator it can shut down). Since some generator must be shut down for
displacement to occur, all displacement is ultimately physical. 37
34. Since under critical water conditions BPA cannot meet the total loads (full DSI load and net
utility loads) it has contracted to serve, the DSI top quartile may also be described as an energy
reserve from which power may be withdrawn to protect firm power customers from shortages, includ-
ing shortages caused by critical water conditions. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 976, Part II, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 48 (1980).
35. DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-43. See also supra note 24.
36. See supra note 7. See also DEIS, supra note 11, at Part 111-9 ("BPA's sale of interruptible
power to industry would provide a portion of the 'forced outage' reserves for the integrated hydro-
thermal system, without which additional generation would have to be built or imported from outside
the region .... ").
37. Utilities sometimes buy BPA nonfirm energy to displace (substitute for) firm energy they
planned to produce with their own dams or power plants but which cannot be produced because
equipment is broken or because on their own hydro systems actual streamflow conditions may be
worse than critical. Here too the planned firm energy production is physically displaced, although by
God or nature rather than utility managers.
287
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Before a generator can be physically shut down it must be installed.
Thus the use of nonfirm energy to displace firm energy from a power
plant avoids, during part of the year, the fuel costs and environmental
impacts of operating the plant, but it avoids neither the cost nor the im-
pacts of building the power plant in the first place. In other words, dis-
placement reduces operating (variable) costs of meeting a load; it does not
reduce capital (fixed) costs. Displacement does not reduce the number of
power plants that must be installed to meet any given load, nor does it
increase the load that may be served by any given power plants.
The other use of nonfirm energy is directly in load, without any genera-
tor having been installed for the purpose of supplying firm power to the
load when nonfirm power is not available. This is the use of nonfirm en-
ergy in the DSI top quartile. It is a use virtually unique to BPA, and
among BPA customers, unique to the DSIs. 38 This use avoids both the
variable and fixed costs of an additional power plant of sufficient size and
capability to supply the load with firm power, as well as the environmen-
tal impact of that plant. 39
In reducing total costs for the region's electrical consumers, displace-
ment is a second-best use of nonfirm energy; the highest and best use is
directly in load without a backup generator, since this is the only way to
meet the region's total load while avoiding the cost of installing addi-
tional generators. But minimizing the cost of meeting the region's total
load may not minimize the cost of meeting the load of a particular utility
or DSI, which is why there is no "highest and best" use of nonfirm en-
ergy except from a regional perspective. For example:
(1) A utility that is building or already owns a displaceable generator
wants to buy as much BPA nonfirm energy as possible for displacement
purposes so that it can reduce its own operating costs; the utility's man-
agement and customers may not particularly care whether this is the best
use of nonfirm energy for the region, whether costs for BPA's other util-
ity customers increase, or whether loads dependent on nonfirm energy
must be interrupted to make possible the utility's cost savings.
(2) Similarly, a DSI that uses nonfirm energy directly in load would not
be mollified by an explanation of the region's highest and best use of
nonfirm energy at the moment when delivery of that energy has just been
interrupted. Part of the DSI load would then face the costly alternatives of
nonfederal replacement energy, 40 energy borrowed at the DSI's risk from
38. The Idaho Power Company, alone among Northwest generating utilities, employs a variant
of average rather than critical water planning on its own (unique) hydro system, and therefore does
not guarantee availability of power to all customers under all circumstances.
39. See supra notes 7 & 36.
40. BPA acts as an agent for the DSIs in acquiring, at the risk and expense of the DSIs, "Indus-
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its own future service, 41 or no energy at all; the DSI would prefer that the
region bear the cost of meeting all its loads, not just its non-DSI loads,
with firm rather than nonfirm energy.
In these circumstances, it might appear that BPA's utility and DSI cus-
tomers could agree that the region should install enough power plants to
meet its total load under critical water conditions, using nonfirm energy
when available solely to displace operation of non-hydro power plants
and reduce their variable costs. Planning of power plants on this basis
would avoid periodic interruptions of the DSI load, and confine the use of
nonfirm energy to displacement purposes. The utilities and DSIs in fact
proposed something very close to this when drafting a regional power bill
in 1977.42 Had that bill been enacted, combination service 43 for the DSI
top quartile would have been replaced with firm power obtained through
installation of additional firm power resources.
BPA did not support this feature of the legislation drafted by utilities
and DSIs. 44 One reason was that the demise of combination service
would have imposed costs in addition to the cost of additional power
plants in the form of lost savings made possible by provisional reservoir
drafts and reduction of unnecessary spills.
C. Spills and Provisional Reservoir Drafts
1. How and Why Firm Energy Is "Borrowed"
The system's reservoir storage capacity is a limiting physical feature.
Spills and provisional reservoir drafts are respectively the consequence
of, and a partial solution for, limited reservoir storage space.
Spill is the passage of water past a dam in a manner that does not pro-
duce power. For any given streamflow level, spill reduces both total
power production and total revenue from nonfirm sales. Water is there-
fore not spilled when it can prudently be stored; fisheries operations,
flood control, recreation and other constraints set the limits of prudence.
When water must be released from reservoirs for non-power purposes, it
is still not spilled if the release can be accomplished by directing water
through turbines to generate power. Sometimes water must be spilled
trial Replacement Energy" (IRE) which the DSls sometimes buy from nonfederal sources (when
available) for use during periods when BPA restricts delivery of certain BPA power. See 16 U.S.C. §
839f(i)(1) (Supp. V 1981) (authorizing BPA to so act).
41. See infra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
43. The concept of combination service is explained in part ID infra.
44. See infra part IuB.
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simply because its release becomes necessary at a time when all genera-
tors or transmission lines are already fully loaded.
To reduce spills and increase useful storage capacity, BPA uses provi-
sional reservoir drafts-" premature" withdrawals of water that would
otherwise be kept in storage for future service to firm loads. 45 Provisional
drafts are made in the fall. These drafts are called "provisional" because
the power they produce is sold with strings attached: provisional drafts
produce firm energy at a time when all firm loads are already being met;
they leave insufficient water in the reservoirs to meet future firm loads if
critical streamflow conditions ensue; therefore they must be accompanied
by techniques to "repay" the borrowed firm energy if it is later needed. 46
By drafting reservoirs earlier and more deeply, below the levels needed
to assure production of the firm power BPA will later require, provisional
drafts produce lower reservoir levels in the fall and winter-a "bigger
hole" to accommodate the spring runoff without spilling. On average, the
provisional drafts thus reduce spills, increase storage capacity and total
power production, and spread costs over more kilowatt-hours of sales
than would otherwise be possible. 47 This is an advantage for all power
consumers.
But there are also potential disadvantages for power consumers. A
deep hole in a reservoir is useful if the spring runoff turns out to be abun-
dant, but not if the runoff turns out to be small. The fundamental feature
of provisional drafts is that they borrow firm (not nonfirm) energy from
the future. Consumers depend on that firm energy being available later.
Although an average spring runoff will "repay" the borrowing-by re-
filling reservoirs to the levels needed to assure production of the system's
planned firm energy-critical or near-critical streamflows will not. Thus
provisional drafts involve risk. Moreover, this risk is incurred by drafting
reservoirs to produce additional firm energy at times when firm loads are
being met and do not need the added energy.
To gain the advantages of provisional drafts without these disadvan-
tages, the system needs both (1) a customer for the firm energy generated
by the provisional drafts, and (2) security for this "borrowing" of firm
energy, that is, a reliable source of firm energy available for "repay-
45. See generally DEIS, supra note 1I, Appendix A, at 11-42 to -48. See also I CONTRACT OFFI-
CIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, at 259-63 (explanation by BPA Power Manager of system benefits of
provisional drafts and related techniques).
46. 1 CONTRACT OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, at 259-63; Coordination Agreement, supra
note 11, § 9(n).
47. See I CONTRACT OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, at 259-63 (explanation by BPA Power
Manager of system benefits of provisional drafts and related techniques). See generally DEIS, supra





ment" purposes should nature fail to repay the borrowing with adequate
streamflows. BPA's use of DSI loads to meet this dual need is examined
immediately below.48
2. The DSIs as Customersfor Borrowed Firm Energy
Long before the concept of "quartiles" originated, BPA recognized
that if a portion of the DSI load were normally served with nonfirm rather
than firm energy, that portion could provide a captive market for firm
energy produced by provisional drafts. Provisional drafts produce energy
in the fall and early winter, when nonfirm energy is usually not available;
to the extent the DSI load relied on nonfirm energy, it would need and
could accept other energy at that time. 49
There were two caveats:
(1) If the full DSI load (like all other BPA loads) were supported by
BPA's installed firm power resources on a year-round basis, the DSIs
would have no need for the "extra" firm energy provisional drafts pro-
duce. As noted above, BPA therefore opposed the feature of the legisla-
tion drafted by utilities and DSIs that would have produced this result.
(2) Conversely, the DSI load could not operate on only a seasonal basis
and still provide a market for the "extra" firm energy. The load would
have to be in operation rather than shut down at the time provisional
drafts were made; a cold potline (aluminum reduction facility) cannot be
restarted quickly or cheaply. 50 Whether the load was operating at the time
48. A topic beyond the scope of this article is the ability of Northwest utilities to serve as a
market for, and to secure repayment of, borrowed firm energy. Some utilities own power plants
whose operation borrowed firm energy could in theory displace. Fewer, however, can provide reli-
able repayment security to BPA. To produce the "extra" firm energy required for repayment during
droughts, the utility must have generating capability in excess of that needed to meet its loads under
critical water conditons; most utilities lack such generation, and none install it deliberately.
Even the "extra" energy capability of utility combustion turbines, see infra note 67,-the poten-
tial energy production of such turbines in excess of that produced in their planned peaking use-is not
necessarily available to BPA as repayment security. The utility, not BPA, physically controls the
turbine. Energy from a turbine not started up at an earlier point cannot later be made up. The utility or
government agencies may resist the costs or environmental impacts of extra operation when the time
comes for repayment ("burning oil to put water back in a reservoir" provokes resistance); fuel may
prove unavailable; the turbine may not perform. Each of these problems has occurred in recent years.
49. The original 20-year provisional energy agreement between BPA and the DSIs was executed
in 1954, and was "conceived by BPA during the development of the first Hungry Horse [project]
operating plan." DEIS, supra note I1, Appendix A, at 11-43.
50. The difficulty is basically caused by the effects of cooling and reheating. Aluminum is pro-
duced in carbon-lined reduction cells known as "pots." Each pot contains a molten chemical bath
into which alumina is introduced and through which an electric current is passed. In the bath, the
current electrolytically decomposes the alumina into aluminum and oxygen. Resistance to the current
produces the heat necessary to keep the bath in a molten state, at about 970 degrees C. See generally
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of the provisional draft would in turn depend largely on whether nonfirm
energy had been continuously available to the load in the months since the
prior year's provisional draft had ended.
BPA could thus use a portion of the DSI load as a captive market for
both nonfirm energy and the firm energy produced by provisional drafts,
but only if this portion of the DSI load were denied by contract the right to
receive the type of firm power service enjoyed by all other BPA custom-
ers, and only if a combination of power sources other than planned firm
resources proved sufficient to keep the load in operation.
3. Other Portions of DSI Load as Repayment Security
The DSI top quartile-otherwise served with nonfirm energy-thus be-
came a market for borrowed firm energy. But the top quartile cannot,
through curtailment, repay borrowed firm energy. Under the critical wa-
ter conditions that require repayment, service to the top quartile has al-
ready been cut off. To "free up" firm energy by withdrawing power from
a load, BPA must interrupt a load normally served by firm resources, that
is, a load not otherwise subject to restriction because of critical water
levels. Thus the DSI second quartile, and now the third, have become the
security for repayment of borrowed energy that is marketed to the DSL
first quartile; it provides reliable security because BPA can physically cut
off the load if a DSI does not curtail on a schedule BPA approves. 51 By
reducing the DSI load in this manner-up to fifty percent of DSI demand
if necessary-BPA can ensure that its remaining firm energy is sufficient
to meet its non-DSI loads.
The result of using another part of the DSI load to secure the borrowing
of firm energy used to serve the DSI top quartile is that the borrowed firm
energy is actually borrowed from the DSIs themselves. It is firm energy
that would otherwise be reserved, and held as water in reservoirs, for the
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, FINAL ALUMAX ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 11-8 to -9
(1981) (describing the potline process).
When the electric current is cut off, the molten bath cools and will ultimately "freeze" perma-
nently into a solid mass unless removed. During brief interruptions of power for only part of the DSI
load, the remaining power may be switched repeatedly from one series of pots (a "potline") to an-
other in an attempt to slow the loss of heat. A prolonged interruption requires one or more potlines to
be taken out of service, however, which unavoidably damages the individual pots. Restoring an idle
potline to service is a lengthy (up to three months) and expensive (more than $1,000,000) process
during which the individual pots must essentially be rebuilt and then reheated. During reheating some
of the carbon pot linings (cathodes) fail; those pots must then be taken out of service and again rebuilt
before their production is restored.
51. See S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1979), relevant portion set forth in text
accompanying note 123 infra. Under the BPA-DSI contracts executed in 1981, 1981 DSI contracts.
supra note 6, the basic firm energy borrowing and repayment provisions are found in contract sec-
tions 8(a) through (d) and 7(e).
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future firm service of the DSI second or third quartiles. If streamflows are
sufficient to restore reservoirs to critical levels, the DSI second or third
quartiles will be served with firm energy as planned even though the top
quartile will not be served with the nonfirm energy on which it depends
unless streamflows are also sufficient to fill reservoirs above critical
levels. If streamflows do not restore reservoirs to at least the critical
levels, however, not only the DSI top quartile but also the second or third
quartile is exposed to interruption so that BPA's other firm loads may be
served.
Thus it is the future firm service of the DSIs themselves, not of other
loads, that provisional drafts jeopardize. The water that remains in reser-
voirs after a provisional draft is sufficient to meet the future firm energy
needs of non-DSI customers even if critical streamflow conditions ensue,
This permits BPA to gain for all customers the benefits that provisional
drafts make possible, while simultaneously protecting its non-DSI cus-
tomers from the risks those drafts entail. 52 The shifting of those risks ex-
clusively to the DSIs has, however, created conflict between BPA and the
DSIs. 53
D. Combination Service-The Generic Concept
Combination service to a portion of the DSI load is not complex as a
generic concept: it is the sequential use of (1) nonfirm energy, and (2)
borrowed DSI firm energy to serve a large load that would otherwise re-
quire firm power resources to be planned and installed. The concept pre-
dates BPA's invention of "quartiles," 54 but is most easily described in
terms of quartiles. 55
BPA uses nonfirm energy to serve the top quartile initially. If; for ex-
ample, the January snowpack survey indicates that annual runoff will ex-
ceed amounts needed to refill reservoirs, BPA begins serving the top
quartile with nonfirm energy at that time. Later in the year, when the
nonfirm energy is no longer available, 56 BPA begins using borrowed DSI
52. See supra note 38; 1981 DSI Contract, supra note 6, § 8(a); DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix
A, at II-42 to -43.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66.
54. See infra part II.
55. The description that follows is a simplified version of the 1981-82 Operating Agreement
between BPA and the DSIs, an annual operating plan developed pursuant to section 8(a) of the DSI
1981 contracts. Operating Agreement, Aug. 14, 1981 (copy on file with the Washington Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as 1981-82 Operating Agreement]. See 1981 DSI Contract, supra note 6.
56. Firm energy not capable of being shaped to meet firm loads (hence "secondary firm" energy
in the original sense, see supra note 12) is also available to BPA in most years between July and
September. BPA used this "pre-Critical Period" firm energy to serve the DSI top quartile for two
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firm energy to continue serving the top quartile, retaining sufficient firm
energy to meet, under critical water conditions, all BPA loads other than
two quartiles of DSI load. 57 The transition must be accomplished while
the load associated with the top quartile of DSI demand is still operating,
since the load cannot be restarted quickly once deliveries stop.
Ideally, service with borrowed DSI firm energy continues until the fu-
ture availability of nonfirm energy can be predicted with relative accu-
racy; in other words, until the January snowpack survey. At this point the
borrowing stops, regardless of what the survey shows. 58 But if the
snowpack survey indicates that nonfirm energy can again be made avail-
able, deliveries of nonfirm energy resume. If nonfirm energy cannot be
made available, BPA service to the DSI top quartile is interrupted, but the
previously borrowed firm energy is not recalled immediately from the
DSI second or third quartiles. The second or third quartile will be inter-
rupted for power purposes only if later surveys and actual runoff show
that because of the provisional drafts, BPA will lack sufficient firm en-
ergy to meet its non-DSI loads.
The hope, of course, is that the spring runoff will exceed critical, at
least to the extent of filling that portion of the "hole" created by the pro-
visional drafts of the previous fall. If streamflow restores reservoirs to
critical elevations-the elevations that would have been maintained in the
absence of the provisional drafts-BPA's ability to meet future firm
loads, including three quartiles of the DSI load, is again assured. Refill of
reservoirs to this level thus discharges the obligation to repay the bor-
rowed energy; 59 through the combination of the provisional draft and the
above-critical streamflow, extra firm energy has been produced, marketed
and paid for.
If snowpack and natural streamflow are even better, as is normally the
case, reservoirs are refilled completely and nonfirm energy again is gener-
months under the 1981-82 Operating Agreement before using borrowed DSI firm energy. See 1981
DSI Contract, supra note 6, § 8(a)(3)(B)(iii); 1981-82 Operating Agreement, supra note 55, at 3.
57. BPA retains its rights to interrupt the DSI top quartile for the purpose of providing reserve
protection to BPA's other firm power customers even during periods when BPA is serving the top
quartile with firm energy. See, e.g., 1981 DSI Contract, supra note 6, § 8(a)(2). This helps empha-
size a key point: BPA's need and ability to interrupt deliveries of DSI top quartile power in order to
protect its other customers from shortages is both conceptually and operationally distinct from BPA's
use of nonfirm rather than firm power to serve the top quartile, since power shortages can be caused
(and interruptions necessitated) by events other than low streamflows. Legislation before Congress in
1977 (but not enacted) would have maintained BPA's ability to restrict deliveries to the top quartile
while requiring BPA to obtain firm power resources for service to the top quartile. S. 2080 & H.R.
9020, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See infra part IliA.
58. 1981 DSI Contract, supra note 6, § 8(a)(4)(E). This limitation applies to the borrowing of
DSI firm energy from future years only, not to borrowings within a single operating year.




ated. Because of the provisional drafts, less water will have been spilled
and more nonfirm power will have been produced, marketed and paid for.
Thus nonfirm energy and borrowed firm energy are combined to serve
a large load while avoiding installation of an additional firm power re-
source. The combination also makes possible operational efficiencies that
independently reduce costs for all BPA customers. Neither nonfirm en-
ergy nor borrowed firm energy alone could produce any of these results:
what makes either type of energy usable for serving loads has always
been and will remain its use in conjunction with the other component of
combination service. This bears emphasis because historically 60 the
greatest danger to combination service has never been a conscious deci-
sion to abandon it. Rather, the danger lies in failing even to recognize that
a combination is involved, and that this service cannot be maintained if
availability of either component is eroded.
F. Some Implications of Combination Service
Neither nonfirm energy alone nor the firm energy borrowed through
provisional drafts can prevent top quartile interruptions, because neither
form of energy is available year round. But when combined, these two
sources of energy can usually keep the entire DSI load operating until the
time when curtailment of fifty percent of the DSI load will leave just
enough firm energy to meet BPA's remaining firm loads.
The early production of nonfirm energy based on snowpack surveys
and the delayed return of borrowed firm energy increases the chance that
the full DSI load will be operating and able to accept borrowed firm en-
ergy when provisional drafts are made; this in turn increases the chance
that the load will be operating when nonfirm energy is available and water
cannot be stored. Within the system's operating constraints, spills and
installed firm resources are minimized, while total sales and total load
served are maximized.
For BPA, the virtues of combination service are that:
(1) the planning and installation of firm resources to serve a load of
some 900 megawatts can be avoided, because combination service can
provide an adequate quantity of power for that part of the DSI load;6l
(2) all BPA customers benefit in the form of lower rates from the re-
duced spills, added sales, and extra revenues that provisional drafts and
an extra market for nonfirm energy make possible;
60. See infra part III.
61. Put another way, BPA can serve 900 more megawatts of load than its firm resources would
otherwise support.
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(3) the DSIs bear the risk of the provisional drafts, and BPA's firm
energy available for other customers is not affected, since the energy bor-
rowed is future DSI firm energy; and
(4) the efficiency made possible by a large nighttime load is
achieved.62
But because the benefits of combination service do not follow the risks,
the DSIs have never been enchanted with combination service. In fact,
this is putting it mildly. As described in more detail below, the history of
combination service is one of:
(1) BPA efforts to perfect a form of combination service that can avoid
the need to plan firm resources for up to twenty-five percent of the DSI
load;
(2) DSI efforts to obtain (or retain) service with BPA firm resources,
especially at times when combination service has not appeared to be an
adequate substitute; and
(3) efforts by certain utilities, some federal agencies and some non-
power groups to achieve other power or nonpower purposes that happen
to erode combination service, generally without any stated recognition
that combination service benefits all BPA customers.
There are ironies here, and the ironies have significance because power
policy is public policy, and increasingly a matter of public discussion and
debate. Because BPA's hydro system operations are complex, combina-
tion service is also complex; its purposes and impacts are easily misun-
derstood and misrepresented. BPA's traditional image has not been that
of an agency determined to limit installation of firm power resources. The
DSIs, although they are the only customers to whom BPA denies 100%
firm power, are nonetheless likely to be portrayed as benefitting from this
less-than-firm service. In these circumstances, BPA's attempts to main-
tain a reasonable availability of nonfirm and borrowed firm energy for the
top quartile is apt to be interpreted as solicitude for the DSIs rather than as
a saving for BPA's non-DSI customers. 63
62. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
63. The difference in perspective is a classic example of an old conundrum: is the top quartile's
"glass" half-full or half empty? Critics of the combination service techniques tend to view BPA as
making herculean efforts to fill the glass, rather than as saving money for non-DSI customers by
denying the DSIs a full glass to begin with. The DSIs, by contrast, are typically more concerned that
other BPA customers have full glasses and the DSIs do not:
If a less costly (hence more valuable) method of providing reserves can be found, the DSIs
would be very pleased. The DSIs would obviously prefer to receive 100 percent firm power and
not be subject to interruption for the purpose of providing power system reserves. At no time has
the payment from Bonneville for interruptions come close to compensating the DSIs for the




Regardless of popular perceptions, the goal of minimizing the firm
power resources needed to carry the total regional load provides the only
explanation for BPA policies that might otherwise seem obscure or
wrongheaded. Nothing else, for example, can explain BPA's longstand-
ing opposition to firm power resources being installed for the DSI top
quartile. 64 Only with combination service can adequate top quartile ser-
vice be provided without an installed firm power resource. If a firm re-
source were installed for this purpose, combination service would no lon-
ger be usable; combination service depends on one portion of a load not
being supported by installed firm resources, and another portion of that
load being subject to restriction notwithstanding its support by installed
firm resources. Installation of an additional firm power resource would
reduce DSI power interruptions, but total sales of nonfirm energy would
be reduced, spillage would increase, the ratio of in-region sales to re-
gional exports would decrease, 65 and the full quantity of energy from pro-
visional drafts could not be marketed or secured with equivalent reliabil-
ity and planning certainty-all because combination service would no
longer be possible.
Similarly, once BPA decided to oppose installation of firm power re-
sources for the DSI top quartile, it tentatively refused to permit DSIs to
own firm resources for use in "firming up" the nonfirm energy supplied
the top quartile. 66 DSI-owned resources would not directly reduce BPA's
sales of nonfirm energy to the DSIs, but they could jeopardize a DSI's
willingness to submit to the forced borrowing of its own firm energy.
Rather than risk future interruption of half its power by borrowing firm
energy when nonfirm energy is not available, a DSI might prefer some
combination of load curtailment and use of backup generators. At the
very least, DSI bargaining power on the terms and conditions of borrow-
ing and repayment would-be increased. Thus, adequate DSI power qual-
ity achieved without added investment and with lower total costs and the
additional benefits of combination service are what BPA believed DSI-
owned resources might jeopardize.
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning: Hearings on H.R. 3508 and H.R. 4159 Before the Sub-
comm. on Energy and Power of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 320, 323 (1979) (statement of author).
64. See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
65. This would occur because substitution of firm for nonfirm energy in the DSI top quartile
would increase the quantity of nonfirm energy available to California and other Southwest markets
without increasing total energy sales in the Northwest.
66. Bonneville Power Administration, Discussion Paper: BPA Policy On Resource Acquisitions
By DSIs To Assure Firm Service To All Four Quartiles, 24 CoNTRAcT OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note
7, at 6581-82 (BPA contract negotiation memorandum, 1981).
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G. Summary
Either of nonfirm energy's two uses-for displacement, or directly in
load-reduces costs for all BPA customers, and for reasons independent
of the fact that water is free and nonfirm energy sales thus produce added
revenue without any added fuel cost. Displacement avoids certain costs of
operating generators otherwise needed to meet firm loads. Use of nonfirm
energy directly in load without a backup generator avoids both the operat-
ing and capital costs of a generator that would otherwise be needed to
carry the same load. Because nonfirm energy is usable in a year-round
load only in combination with other energy, its use in load also permits
other energy to be produced through reservoir operations that further re-
duce costs for all BPA customers.
Much attention has been devoted to the possibility of serving firm load
growth by combining nonfirm energy with seasonal operation of a backup
generator. 67 Depending on operating and capital costs and BPA's nonfirm
energy rate, this might cost less than meeting that same growth with a
more conventional firm power resource such as a coal or nuclear plant.
But from a regional standpoint, it is cheaper still to meet an equivalent
amount of load with nonfirm energy for which no additional firm power
resource is installed at all, even as a backup. For this reason, use of non-
firm energy directly in load without backup generation will remain the
region's highest and best use of nonfirm energy for any given total system
load.
The challenge has always been to combine nonfirm energy with special
operating techniques to make the combined commodity usable in load.
By so doing, the highest and best use becomes higher and better-if the
combination can be maintained. The inability to maintain this combina-
tion when nonfirm energy is used first for other purposes is a cost, often
unrecognized, of those other purposes. As shown below, this interdepen-
dence was very much on the minds of BPA planners during the lengthy
legislative process that ended in 1980 with enactment of the Pacific
67. For example, backup generation could be supplied by a "combustion turbine." Combustion
turbines burn gas or oil to produce hot combustion gases that drive turbines and generate electricity.
Although turbines are inefficient from the standpoint of fuel conversion efficiency, use nonrenewable
fuel, cause pollution and noise problems, and have relatively high operating costs (depending on the
price of gas or oil), they have relatively low capital costs and can be installed quite quickly. Few
combustion turbines have traditionally been installed in the Northwest, compared with other regions:
most of these are operated primarily to meet peak loads. See generally DEIS, supra note 1I, Part 1. at
V-104 to -107. Note that using a turbine to "firm up" nonfirm energy is the same as displacing
operation of the turbine with nonfirm energy when available for this purpose.
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Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest
Power Act). 68
A final general point: from a power supply standpoint, it would of
course be cheaper for the system not to carry some of the region's load at
all. In other words, it may be cheapest to meet load growth by dropping
service to an equivalent amount of existing load. In fact, dropping a load
served by a firm resource is cheapest of all. It would be cheaper to drop
twenty-five percent of Seattle's load, for example, or twenty-five percent
of the load of Pacific Power & Light, than to drop an equivalent part of
the DSI top quartile; the Seattle and PP&L loads are supported by firm
power resources that are already installed and capable of meeting firm
load growth, even without added backup generators. The objective, how-
ever, is not to save money by failing to meet the system's load, but rather
to save money while meeting that load.
II. TOP QUARTILE SERVICE PRIOR TO THE NORTHWEST
POWER ACT
A. Service Prior to the Modified Firm (MF) Contracts
DSI service prior to 1975 defies simple analysis in contemporary
terms, because until 1975 there was no concept of "quartiles" in BPA's
industrial contracts. The quality of power varied among DSIs, depending
on the power and transmission facilities available to BPA when each con-
tract was signed. During certain years, BPA sold large quantities of "in-
terruptible" power to some of the industries. Almost from the outset, bor-
rowed firm energy from provisional drafts was used in combination with
these nonfirm energy sales.
Some DSIs began with contracts for 100% firm energy, however, and
others obtained such contracts. Until the late 1960's, the general intent of
BPA and the DSIs was to firm up the entire industrial load eventually. 69
The lack of a single, coherent industrial sales policy was first addressed
during the 1960's in the Modified Firm (MF) contracts, but was overcome
only in the Industrial Firm (IF) contracts of 1975.
B. The Modified Firm (MF) Contracts
The Modified Firm (MF) contracts were twenty-year DSI contracts ex-
ecuted between 1961 and 1971. The MF contracts are not uniform be-
68. Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 839 (Supp. V 1981))
[hereinafter cited as Northwest Power Act].
69. See, e.g., DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-7.
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cause during this decade BPA's industrial sales policies were evolving.
The Modified Firm energy provided under most MF contracts was en-
tirely firm. Most MF contracts provided each DSI an amount of power
roughly equivalent to only seventy-five percent of its total load, however,
thus incorporating a conceptual precursor of quartiles. But some DSIs re-
ceived MF contracts for up to 100% of their total demand, while some
received lower percentages.
Generally, any portion of DSI load not served with Modified Firm
power was provided combination service with (1) nonfirm, or "interrupti-
ble," energy, and (2) borrowed DSI firm energy, called Provisional En-
ergy. The latter energy, from provisional drafts, was provided under a
separate Provisional Energy Agreement. 70
Thus, under the MF contracts the combination of nonfirm energy with
provisional drafts-traditional for some DSIs-was continued, refined
and made more uniform, with combination service for twenty-five per-
cent of each DSI's demand as BPA's goal. Nonfirm energy was never
relied on as the exclusive source of BPA power for any portion of DSI
demand. But it may seem curious today that BPA and the DSIs, who
previously intended to firm up the full DSI load when resources permit-
ted, deliberately chose combination service instead. The explanation has
three parts:
(1) Combination service and its benefits to other BPA customers were
what Bernard Goldhammer, then BPA's power manager, devised and
wanted, primarily to increase the total load BPA could serve and maxi-
mize BPA's total sales and hence revenues.
(2) The projected availability of energy to DSIs through combination
service was very high. Infrequent and brief interruptions seemed more
likely than frequent and lengthy ones. Regardless of BPA's sales priori-
ties for nonfirm energy, none of it would be diverted to the Southwest
before DSI loads were served, 71 and very little could even theoretically be
diverted to Northwest utilities for displacement purposes, because those
utilities owned little displaceable generation at that time. The availability
of borrowed DSI firm energy was expected to be high because the Provi-
sional Energy Agreement contemplated very substantial provisional
70. For description of this agreement and operations under it, see DEIS, supra note 11, Appen-
dix A, at 11-43 to -45.
71. Public Law 88-552, passed in 1964, limits the sale outside the Pacific Northwest of federal
hydroelectric power for which there is a market in the region or which can be conserved for use in the
region. Act of Aug. 31, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-552, 78 Stat. 756 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 837 (1976).
Although Public Law 88-552 has no short title, it is sometimes called "'The Northwest Regional
Preference Act," a misnomer because the law applies reciprocally to both the Northwest and South-





drafts, and repayment of the borrowed energy was to be postponed until
the last possible moment in the hope that nature would instead restore
reservoirs with abundant streamflows. 72
(3) Compared to present conditions, non-federal replacement energy
was more frequently available to the DSIs, and at costs quite close to the
BPA rate. 73 Thus, if interruptions of DSI power occurred, the likelihood
was great that reasonably priced replacement power would be available.
Under these circumstances, combination service seemed likely to pro-
duce substantial cost savings for BPA customers generally without im-
posing unacceptable costs on the DSIs specifically.
C. The Industrial Firm (IF) Contracts
The Industrial Firm (IF) contracts of 1975 were never executed except
on an "interim" basis, but they became the contracts under which BPA
and the DSIs operated, month-to-month, for nearly seven years. 74 They
were intended to supersede the MF contracts as part of Phase 2 of the
Hydro-Thermal Power Program. Because they were written simultane-
ously, and reflected a single industrial sales policy, the IF contracts were
virtually uniform among DSIs.
The IF contracts were novel in many respects. 75 But for present pur-
poses their distinctive features were:
(1) Unlike the MF contracts, the IF contracts provided service to each
DSI's entire load-not just seventy-five percent of that load-with a sin-
gle, integrated class (or grade) of power known as "Industrial Firm
Power." The amount of power necessary to meet each DSI's full load,
72. See DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-44.
73. See, e.g., Periods of Restriction and Sources of Replacement, 16 RATES RECORD, supra note
7, at 9098 (cost statistics).
74. One IF contract (that of Alumax Pacific Corporation) was executed by both parties. The
others were not executed, primarily because court orders prevented BPA from doing so until comple-
tion of an EIS on "Phase 2" of the Hydro-Thermal Power Program, of which the IF contracts were
intended to have been part. Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1979); NRDC v. Hodel,
435 F. Supp. 590 (D. Or. 1977), affd, 626 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1980). By "interim letter agreements"
signed in early 1975, BPA and the DIs agreed to operate in accordance with the IF contracts until
cancellation by either party, an event the interim letter agreements permitted upon 30 days' notice by
either party. For a description of the IF contracts, and Phase 2 and how it "stalled," see DEIS, supra
note 11, Part 1, at 11-13 to -17.
75. For example the IF contracts permitted BPA for the first time to protect its firm utility loads
by withdrawing large quantities of power from that portion of the DSI load supported by firm power
resources, and to do so for reasons (e.g., delayed completion of thermal power plants) other than the
"recapture" of previously borrowed DSI firm energy. The "energy planning reserve" thus created in
the DSI second quartile was further refined in 1980 by Congress. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 976, Part
II, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1980). Second quartile restriction rights are related to but distinct from
top quartile restriction rights, and are not discussed here.
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measured in kilowatts of load size, was the "amount" of power sold un-
der the IF contract. 76
(2) The IF contracts divided the DSI load into quartiles for the purpose
of defining specific BPA rights to restrict deliveries of Industrial Firm
Power. For example, BPA had a contract right to restrict twenty-five per-
cent, the top quartile, of each DSI's demand "at any time." 77
(3) In place of Provisional Energy provided outside the MF contracts,
the IF contracts incorporated the borrowing of DSI firm energy directly
into the contract. Nonfirm and "Advance Energy" for the new "top
quartile" became part of the Industrial Firm Power under the contracts;
Advance Energy replaced Provisional Energy as the borrowed firm en-
ergy component of combination service. The Provisional Energy Agree-
ment was permitted to expire.78
(4) The IF contracts provided a single rate (the "IF- 1" rate) for all DSI
power, including top quartile deliveries whether supported by nonfirm or
borrowed firm energy. 79
(5) The IF- 1 rate schedule provided that if BPA failed to deliver power
for any part of a DSI's demand, including the top quartile, BPA would
76. The IF contracts and the phrase "amount of power" have continuing legal significance for
DSI power sales because Congress has required BPA to offer the DSIs contracts for an "amount of
power" equivalent to that to which they were entitled under the IF contracts. 16 U.S.C. §
839c(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981). The "amount of power" sold by federal power marketing agencies to
industrial customers is a term of art referring to the customer's load size measured in kilowatts of
contract demand, rather than a quantity of energy measured in units of consumption (kilowatt-hours).
This is true of BPA's DSI contracts as well as industrial contracts of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
See TVA 1979 Annual Report vol. II. app. 245-46 (contract with Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.,
for an "amount of power" of 21,200 kilowatts) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). See
also Niagara Redevelopment Act of 1957, 16 U.S.C. § 836(b)(3) (1976), allocating for service to
electro-process industries "445,000 kilowatts" (445 megawatts) of power. In Central Lincoln Peo-
ples' Utility Dist. v. Johnson, 686 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussed infra at part IV), both sides
argued that the meaning of "amount of power" had decisional significance, but the court did not use
or explain the phrase in its opinion.
77. IF contract, Exhibit C (General Contract Provisions) § 8(b), 23 CONTRACT OFFICIAL REC-
ORDS, supra note 7, at 6274, 6305. See infra parts IIC & lID. Note that BPA's rights to restrict DSI
power deliveries are contained in sections of the contract distinct from the sections that determine the
"amount of power" sold (the latter is section 4 of the IF contract).
78. "Advance energy retains most of the characteristics of provisional energy except that BPA
expects to supply advance energy by proportionally drafting Hungry Horse and the five new cyclic
reservoirs [Duncan, Arrow, and Mica in Canada, Libby and Dworshak in the U.S.] below the normal
operating levels required for firm power, rather than only Hungry Horse .... " DEIS, supra note 1I,
Appendix A, at 11-46. The expectation proved partially wrong. See infra text accompanying note 88.
79. The IF-I rate took effect on December 20, 1974. The IF-2 rate, effective December 20.
1979, retained the IF-I rate's feature of a single rate for all DSI quartiles and the "availability credit"





compensate that DSI by paying it an "availability credit," or retroactive
rate adjustment. 80
These features of the IF contracts are discussed below in connection
with the 1980 statutory allocation of power to the DSIs.
D. History of Operations Under the IF Contract
1. Interruptions
The experience under the IF contracts helps explain (a) the changes in
DSI service made by the Northwest Power Act, and (b) the DSI service
contemplated in the current 1981 DSI contracts designed to effectuate the
Act. In the ten years of 1968-1977, BPA restricted more than twenty
billion kwh of deliveries to the top twenty-five percent of the DSI load. 81
This represented roughly ten percent of total DSI demand for this pe-
riod.82 In other words, the DSIs in effect lost one full year of service
during that decade, enough power to produce 2.5 billion pounds of alumi-
num at 8 kwh per pound.
Under the IF contracts, the DSIs paid a single rate for all power. From
1974 through 1979, this was the IF-1 rate. When any portion of DSI de-
mand, including the top quartile, was interrupted for any reason, the DSIs
received an availability credit or retroactive rate adjustment, but only if
BPA could not continue top quartile service with Advance Energy, that
is, with firm energy borrowed from the DSIs themselves through provi-
sional drafts. The credit was originally set to return the DSIs enough
money to buy replacement energy from nonfederal sources during the pe-
riods of interruption, if such energy was available. 83
In effect, BPA's other customers paid to use the power denied the DSIs
by BPA restrictions, but the DSIs' use of such power at all other times
produced revenue for BPA at a firm power rate (the IF-1 rate), made pos-
sible the benefits of provisional drafts, and avoided the cost of additional
generation that would otherwise have been necessary to carry the DSI
load on the same firm power basis as all other BPA loads.
80. BPA Wholesale Power Rate Schedule and General Rate Schedule Provisions Effective Dec.
20,1974, schedule IF-I, § 3 (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
81. See Pacific Northwest Electric Power Supply and Conservation: Hearings on H.R. 9020,
H.R. 9664, and H.R. 5862 Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., I st Sess. Part IV, at 165 (1977) (BPA statistics)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
82. Id.
83. See generally Correspondence of BPA and DSIs with Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC), Docket No. EF80-201 1, BPA letter of Nov. 12, 1982, at 4-5 (proceedings to review




Many factors militated against any simple continuation of the top quar-
tile service provided by the IF contracts, however. Three were para-
mount:
(1) Northwest utilities were building power plants whose output might
be displaced with BPA nonfirm energy. 84 Regardless of the highest and
best use of nonfirm energy from a regional standpoint, some utilities en-
joyed statutory "preference" rights to federal power and might ultimately
absorb so much nonfirm energy for displacement purposes that the top
quartile would be interrupted more frequently than served. Among other
results, this would mean Advance Energy-the DSI firm energy bor-
rowed through provisional drafts to provide the second component of
combination service-would become less useful and provide fewer bene-
fits to all BPA customers.
(2) Advance Energy became less available than originally contem-
plated, as explained below, and its repayment through DSI second quar-
tile curtailments became more likely. Thus, both parts of the combination
service were jeopardized.
(3) The cost of nonfederal replacement energy increased sharply after
1974. By 1979, BPA abandoned any pretense of paying a credit sufficient
to permit the DSIs to purchase such energy when interrupted.8 5 This
made interruptions far more costly for the DSIs. It also destroyed any
objective basis for setting the amount of the credits, as well as the justifi-
cation for charging the DSIs a firm power rate for nonfirm service.
The bad water years of 1973, 1977 and 1979-in which each DSI lost
all or most of its top quartile for twelve months-emphasized how prob-
lematic combination service had already become. Given the interruptions
already experienced and those already foreseen, the DSIs became unwill-
ing to accept continuation of the particular combination service provided
by the IF contract and began seeking a substitute.
2. Advance Energy
In the IF contracts, Advance Energy was a form of provisional draft
intended to have relatively little risk to the DSIs. Service with Advance
typically began in the fall, when nonfirm service to the top quartile was
normally cut off. The Advance was expected to carry the top quartile until
the January snowpack survey, at which time, with luck, nonfirm service
84. For example, 88 publicly-owned utilities and electric cooperatives, each a "preference" cus-
tomer of BPA, executed in 1976 Participants Agreements to finance and construct two large nuclear
power plants, Washington Public Power Supply System Projects Nos. 4 & 5. Washington Public
Power Supply System Nuclear Projects Nos. 4 and 5, Participants' Agreement, Apr. 15, 1976.




could be restored. Under the IF contracts, a DSI's potential obligation to
repay Advance could be deferred for more than three years, ample time
for nature to refill reservoirs and discharge the obligation under most re-
corded natural runoffs. 86 This meant the risk of having to curtail the sec-
ond quartile to repay Advance was relatively remote.
Three things went wrong:
(1) The full quantity of Advance Energy expected from provisional
drafts under the U.S.-Canadian treaty87 has never materialized. Canadian
authorities have not yet permitted reservoirs to be drafted for this pur-
pose. Advance was limited to the energy produced from the equivalent
feet of draft at the three U.S. reservoirs-about forty percent of the ex-
pected amount. 88 This increased the risk for BPA and the DSIs that even
in good water years DSI loads might already be shut down for lack of
energy before service with nonfirm energy could resume.
(2) The Corps of Engineers intervened. Instead of letting the potential
DSI repayment obligation be carried as long as power opeiations would
permit, so that above-critical streamflows might discharge it, the Corps in
the late 1970's insisted that under certain circumstances the draft be re-
paid in the same year it was made.89 These circumstances were not re-
lated to power, but to recreation. If repayment could assure optimum res-
ervoir levels for recreation during the recreation season, the Corps or the
Bureau of Reclamation might insist on repayment. This dramatically in-
creased DSI exposure to massive fifty percent curtailment. Yet under the
IF contracts, the DSIs could not decline this risk by refusing Advance
except at the cost of losing the availability credit.
(3) The potential interruption of top quartile deliveries to divert non-
firm energy to future displacement uses by preference utilities made it less
likely, on average, that the nonfirm energy component of combination
service would follow the borrowed energy component soon enough to
prevent the DSI load from being frequently shut down first.
86. See DEIS, supra note I1, Appendix A, at 11-44.
87. Columbia River Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961-Sept. 16, 1964, United States-Canada, 15 U.S.T.
1555, T.I.A.S. 5638.
88. DEIS, supra note 1I, Appendix A, at 11-45, 11-46. As noted in note 78, supra, the three U.S.
reservoirs are Hungry Horse, Libby and Dworshak.
89. DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-48. The conditions ultimately insisted upon by the
Corps are contained in BPA Contract No. DE-MS79-80BP90 114 (1979) (agreement between BPA,
Corps, and Bureau of Reclamation "Operating Arrangements and Procedures Relating to the Provi-
sional Operation of Reservoirs for the Delivery of Advance Energy and Return of Provisional Storage
Drafts") (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
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3. The Lesson Learned: Firm for Operations, Not Planning
The DSI reaction to these developments was to lose faith in combina-
tion service. Thus, the DSIs sought through legislation to have the top
quartile provided the same firm power service as all other BPA loads. 90
But another reaction was possible, looking at each component of combi-
nation service separately:
a. The Provisional Draft Component
(i) The Advance Energy impediments posed by Corps' policy appeared
to exist because the Corps did not consider twenty-five percent of the DSI
load to be "firm." Firm loads are not curtailed to meet recreation goals.
If the Corps were to treat the entire DSI load as firm for purposes of oper-
ating the hydroelectric system, repayment of Advance on a power time-
table, rather than a recreation timetable, might be expected.
(ii) In addition, if the entire DSI load was treated as firm for purposes
of resource operation, a variant of provisional drafts to supplement or
replace Advance Energy could be found in "shifts" of BPA's "Firm En-
ergy Load Carrying Capability" (FELCC)91 under the Pacific Northwest
Coordination Agreement. 92 By shifting its FELCC-using its firm energy
earlier rather than later-BPA could make the DSI top quartile borrow
firm energy otherwise reserved for service to the DSI second or third
quartiles in later years. But BPA could exercise this Coordination Agree-
ment right only if the top quartile were treated as a firm load for purposes
of resource operation, since the Coordination Agreement permits FELCC
to be shifted for firm loads only. 93
90. See infra part II.
91. The "firm energy load carrying capability" of a power plant or the power system is basically
the firm load whose service the plant or system can assure during the 42-1/2 month Critical Period.
See supra note 83. As a signatory to the Coordination Agreement, supra note 11, BPA is entitled to
receive a share of the coordinated system's energy capability. This share, BPA's FELCC, is the
maximum firm energy which BPA is entitled to demand from the coordinated system during the
Critical Period. DEIS, supra note 11, Appendix A, at 11-34. The Agreement permits BPA and other
parties to "shift" FELCC by declaring a larger firm load during the early months of the Critical
Period and a correspondingly smaller firm load during later months. This borrowing of future firm
energy is akin to a provisional reservoir draft. One principal difference is that a "shift" of FELCC in
effect changes the timing of firm energy use from one operating year to another, rather than from one
season to another within a single year. The Agreement also permits movement of FELCC within any
given year, however ("flexibility" FELCC). See S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1979).
92. Coordination Agreement, supra note 11. The Coordination Agreement is a long term con-
tract among many (not all) federal and nonfederal reservoir operators in the Northwest. Its purpose in
part is to coordinate operation of the region's hydro system and to define the rights of different opera-
tors and their obligations to one another. For a brief summary of the history and operation of the





(iii) Treatment of the top quartile as a firm load had to be limited to the
context of operations and not extended to planning, or combination ser-
vice would be impossible. If the top quartile were firm for all purposes,
BPA would be obligated to plan for and acquire additional firm power
resources to serve it, just as it would for any other firm load. This would
force BPA and the region to incur the very costs that combination service
was intended to avoid.
BPA therefore developed the concept of treating the top quartile as firm
for purposes of resource operation, but not for purposes of resource plan-
ning. 94 As noted above, 95 for BPA to avoid the cost of new power plants
and continue to produce the benefits of combination service, it was neces-
sary that the top quartile be treated as firm for purposes of resource opera-
tion only.
b. The Nonfirm Energy Component
If the top quartile were treated as a BPA firm load for purposes of re-
source operation, the availability of the nonfirm energy component of
combination service would also be enhanced-automatically. This would
occur because BPA's resources, including dams and water available for
production of nonfirm energy, would be operated to serve all BPA loads,
including the top quartile. Only after all BPA loads were met could those
resources be operated for other purposes, including the purpose of selling
BPA nonfirm energy to utilities that use such energy to displace the oper-
ation of their own power plants. The use of nonfirm energy directly in
load would thus take priority over sales of nonfirm energy to utilities
whose full loads were already being met. 96
To secure the nonfirm portion of combination service, it would thus be
sufficient to treat the top quartile as firm for purposes of resource opera-
tion-the same treatment that would ensure that enough DSI firm energy
could be borrowed from the future to make combination service continu-
ous under average, but not critical, water conditions.
94. Thus, when planning the construction and acquisition of additional power plants, the top
quartile would not be counted as a load for which such plants would be required.
95. See supra part L.
96. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., Ist. Sess. 59 (1979) (top quartile will be "served
with resources which are in excess of critical planning amounts but operated to meet the entire DSI
load as if it were firm"). For more detailed discussion by the BPA Power Manager, see I CONTRACT
OFFCIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, at 254-91.
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III. TOP QUARTILE SERVICE UNDER THE NORTHWEST
POWER ACT
A. The PNUCC Bill
The PNUCC bill (for "Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Com-
mittee," the organization under whose auspices it was drafted97) reflected
DSI disillusionment with combination service, not BPA concepts de-
signed to make combination service viable throughout the future. Intro-
duced by request in 1977,98 the PNUCC bill was drafted primarily by
Northwest utilities and DSIs.
The PNUCC bill provided each DSI three quartiles of firm power at
one rate, and, initially, one quartile of nonfirm energy at a lower rate. 99
BPA could thus have continued combination service to the top quartile for
any DSI that elected it. But the bill also provided each DSI the option of
receiving firm power for its top quartile at a higher rate. The DSI need
only give notice to BPA, and BPA would be obligated to plan for and
acquire the additional firm power resources needed for this purpose. 100
The reasons the DSIs sought firm power service are discussed above:
combination service had been breaking down, and further erosion seemed
likely. The DSI and utility drafters of the PNUCC bill believed the time
had come to plan firm resources to support top quartile service. 10 1 As
shown below, BPA was not convinced. It sought instead to perfect com-
bination service.
B. The Regional Bill
1. Preparing the Bill
When the PNUCC bill died, Northwest members of Congress,
PNUCC, BPA and others set out to find a substitute. On top quartile is-
sues, BPA took the position that (1) building a firm resource to serve a
97. PNUCC is essentially an umbrella group for all BPA customers in the Northwest. For a brief
description of PNUCC, see DEIS, supra note 1I, Appendix A, at II-2 to -3.
98. S. 2080 and H.R. 9020, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See 123 CONG REc 28407 (1977)
(House); 123 CONG. REC 28553 (1977) (Senate). For brief description of the legislation, see id. at
28412-14.
99. S. 2080, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 7(f), 123 CON6 REC. 28554 (1977). Although the PNUCC
bill would have obligated BPA to plan firm rather than nonfirm energy sources for top quartile ser-
vice, BPA would have retained contract rights to restrict delivery of DSI top quartile power, since the
top quartile remains a reserve to protect other BPA loads regardless of whether BPA plans to serve it
with firm or nonfirm energy. For discussion of DSI rate, resource, and reserve provisions of PNUCC
bill, see Hearings, supra note 81, Part I, at 276-83 (testimony of Gordon C. Culp, PNUCC counsel).





load that combination techniques could serve was not acceptable, and (2)
it wished to retain for its other customers the benefits of combination ser-
vice. BPA therefore devised the combination service that, with a few sig-
nificant changes, the DSIs now receive.
BPA's proposed form of combination service required legislative assis-
tance. To maintain the availability of nonfirm in the combination, for ex-
ample, the use of nonfirm energy directly in load had to be given priority
over "surplus" sales of such energy to utilities for displacement pur-
poses. Thus:
(1) BPA's contract obligation to the DSIs had to include 100% of the
DSI load, not seventy-five percent. This would require BPA to use all
available energy, including nonfirm, to meet all BPA loads, including the
DSI top quartile, before selling any energy to utilities as "surplus" en-
ergy to be used for displacement purposes. To make top quartile service a
BPA contract obligation, the DSI contracts therefore had to cover either
the "load requirements" of each DSI102 or the "amount of power" to
which each DSI was entitled under its IF contract of 1975.103
(2) No power, firm or nonfirm, could be considered surplus until all
BPA contract obligations, including to the DSIs, were met. 104
(3) BPA's rights to interrupt, curtail or otherwise withdraw DSI power
must be limited to interruptions needed to protect BPA's firm loads from
shortages, 105 thus precluding interruptions of DSI top quartile service "at
any time" for the purpose of supplying preference utilities with excess
power used only for displacement of utility power plants.
To improve the borrowed energy component of combination service, it
was necessary only that the legislation not limit the resources BPA relied
on to meet its contractual obligation to the full DSI load. This would per-
mit BPA to treat the full DSI load as firm for purposes of resource opera-
tion. 106 It would also give BPA the ability to treat the entire DSI load as
firm for all purposes if, at some future time, combination service deterior-
ated. 107
102. This was the approach in the 1978 version of the BPA bill. 124 CONG. REC. 26396 (1978)
(section 5(c) of S. 3418, providing BPA powerforeach DSI's "load requirements").
103. This was the approach in the final version of the Northwest Power Act. Northwest Power
Act, supra note 68, § 5(d)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 76.
104. Northwest Power Act, supra note 68, § 5(f), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(f) (Supp. V 1981).
105. Id. § 3(17), 5(d)(1)(A), 16 U.S.C. § 839a(17), 839c(d)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
106. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
107. The Act does not limit the resources BPA may use to meet the contracted load requirements
of its customers; it entitles BPA customers to "power" for certain statutorily defined loads, and BPA
must provide such power, but the source of the power is unrestricted. The Act itself also contains no
mention of DSI quartiles. See, e.g., Northwest Power Act, supra note 68, § 5(b)(l), 16 U.S.C. §




2. The Bill in the Ninety-fifth Congress
In August, 1978, after the new bill was unveiled, BPA prepared and
distributed to its customers and the bill's congressional sponsors a de-
tailed analysis of the bill's power allocation provisions. The analysis de-
scribed at some length the proposed DSI service. The following excerpt is
particularly important:
The greatest opportunity for a change in the prospective industrial firm
sales is in operations affecting the predictable supply to the DSI load and in
a corresponding increase in the reserves they provide. By treating the entire
DSI load as a firm load, subject to interruption in favor of other loads in the
region, the DSIs will receive service which is closer to full service under
many more operating conditions than they do at present. The DSI load is
uniquely able to be considered in this fashion because they can borrow on
the expectation of better than critical streamflows or resource production,
yet stand ready to curtail their loads beyond the normal reserve requirement
in order to protect continued service to regional firm loads. The expected
increase in industrial firm supply on a long-term average is from a present
75% industrial firm with 14% additional nonfirm sales to nearly 96% indus-
trial firm service. 108
This statement grew and changed until, a year later, it became the more
detailed statement in Appendix B of the Senate committee report. 109
Hearings were held on the new bill. On September 5 and 8, 1978, for
example, Mr. Jack Speer of Anaconda Aluminum testified before the
Senate and House. While unhappy about the DSI rates (higher than under
the PNUCC bill), Mr. Speer did applaud the treatment of the top quartile:
"BPA's treatment of all our loads as firm except when interruptions are
necessary to protect other firm loads will provide us with more usable
energy, still protect firm loads and at the same time reduce spillage of
valuable water." I10
The bill had one markup in the Ninety-fifth Congress, conducted by
Representative Lloyd Meeds (D-Washington), a sponsor and chairman of
the House Water and Power Resources Subcommittee. That markup re-
sulted in two additions to the bill that affected combination service for the
DSI top quartile; each of these additions was retained when the bill be-
came law more than two years later. Before markup, the subcommittee
counsel proposed certain amendments, among them one making "re-
serves" a defined term. In a memorandum to Meeds, the counsel said of
this definition:
108. 25 CONTRACT OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 7, at 6748-50 (excerpt); 16 RATES RECORD.
supra note 7, at 8834-74 (complete document).
109. S. REP No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1979). See infra text accompanying note 123.




"Reserves" as used in reference to the DSI contracts becomes a defined
term in order to satisfy the preference customers as well as the DSIs, and the
definition makes clear that the reserves are for the benefit of firm loads
within the region. The latter aids BPA in operating the river, and makes
good on one element of the program needed to produce the rates BPA has
estimated. 11
The subcommittee adopted the counsel's proposed amendment:
"Reserves" as used in connection with power sold to the direct-service
industrial customers means the energy and/or capacity available to the Ad-
ministrator through contract rights to interrupt, curtail, or otherwise with-
draw, for the benefit of firm loads within the Pacific Northwest, portions of
the energy and/or capacity supplied such customers when needed to avert
particular planning and/or operating contingencies specified in his contracts
with such customers. 112
With several changes, this definition became that now found in section
3(17) of the Act. 113 It aids BPA in operating the river, as the counsel's
memo said, by making clear that BPA's rights to "interrupt, curtail, or
otherwise withdraw" power from the DSIs are for the benefit of firm
loads. Thus, BPA cannot interrupt DSI power in order to make nonfirm
energy available to utilities for displacement purposes, or to raise reser-
voir levels for recreational purposes. The subcommittee further empha-
sized this purpose of BPA's DSI restriction rights by amending the sec-
tion of the legislation that required DSI sales to provide reserves; after the
word "reserves" the subcommittee added the phrase "for the firm power
loads served by the Administrator within the Pacific Northwest." 114 This
limitation is now found in section 5(d)(1)(A) of the Act. 115
At the request of the Northwest delegation and BPA customers, BPA
prepared an annotated section-by-section analysis of the subcommittee
amendments, which states in pertinent part:
111. Unpublished memorandum from John Whittaker to Rep. Lloyd Meeds, Chairman of the
House Water & Power Resources Subcomm., regarding Major Recommended Staff Changes in H.R.
13931, at I (Sept. 22, 1978) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
112. Adopted Amendments by Water and Power Subcomm. (Rep. Lloyd Meeds, Chairman) of
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs to H.R. 13931, at 4 (no date) (unpublished report
prepared by BPA) (underscoring, indicating subcommittee's amendments, omitted) (copy on file
with the Washington Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Meeds's Markup].
113. 16U.S.C. §839a(17)(Supp. V 1981).
114. Meeds' Markup, supra note 112, at I1 (underscoring, indicating subcommittee's amend-
ments, omitted).
115. 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981) ("Such sales shall provide a portion of the
Administrator's reserves for firm power loads within the region."). See also S. REP. No. 272, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1979) ("It is not intended that the Administrator's reserves will be used to
protect other than firm loads.").
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This amendment would define the word "reserves" as used throughout the
bill. It makes clear that the reserves are for the benefit of firm loads within
the region.
This amendment allows the Administrator to sell power to direct-service
industrial customers so long as such sales provide reserves for the firm
power loads served by the Administrator within the region. Such sales do
not have to provide reserves for non-firm power loads within the region. 116
By making clear that BPA's rights to "interrupt, curtail, or otherwise
withdraw" DSI power-an inclusive phrase-would be used to protect
firm loads only, not to make nonfirm sales, these proposed statutory pro-
visions would secure the nonfirm energy portion of the contemplated
combination service.
3. The Bill in the Ninety-sixth Congress
After the bill was reintroduced in the Ninety-sixth Congress, the provi-
sions relevant to combination service were further clarified:
(1) BPA's contract obligation to the DSIs (the initial allocation, subject
to restriction) was for 100% of the DSI load as it had been under the IF
contracts of 1975. 117
(2) BPA could not sell surplus firm or nonfirm energy until its contract
obligations, including to the DSIs, were met. 118
(3) BPA's rights to "interrupt, curtail, or otherwise withdraw" power
from the DSIs were to protect firm power customers from shortages, not
"contingencies." 119 In response to written questions from the House En-
ergy and Power Subcommittee, BPA formally confirmed that the phrase
"interrupt, curtail, or otherwise withdraw" was inclusive, "in order to
embrace all forms of power delivery restriction to the DSIs." 120
(4) BPA was expressly deemed to have sufficient power to execute all
contracts mandated by the Act, thus freeing the DSI and private utility
contracts from challenge on "preference clause" grounds. 121
116. Meeds' Markup, supra note 112, at 24, 27.
117. Northwest Power Act, supra note 68, § 5(d)(1)(B), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(d)(l)(B) (Supp. V
1981). See supra note 76, 102, 103 and accompanying text.
118. Northwest Power Act, supra note 68, § 5(f), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(f) (Supp. V 1981).
119. Id.§3(17),16U.S.C.§839a(17)(Supp. V 1981).
120. Letter from Sterling Munro, Administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration, to
Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy & Power Subcommittee, at 14 (Oct. 18, 1979)
(copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
121. Northwest Power Act, supra note 68, § 5(g)(7), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(g)(7) (Supp. V 1981).
See H.R. REP. No. 96-976 (Part I), 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37, 64 (1980). This provision of the Act
was added by amendment in the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources simultaneously




The legislative history was also made more clear. In February and July
1979, BPA revised for customers and Congress its analysis of allocation
under the bill.122 These analyses described top quartile service as BPA
had in its August 1978 analysis; the July 1979 analysis became Appendix
B of the Senate report:
The quantity of [DSI] power for rate purposes is based on the proportion of
the total industrial requirement, on a long-term average (currently estimated
to be between 85 percent and 96 percent of the total DSI load), that BPA
projects it will be able to serve directly. This projected availability is predi-
cated on the continued planning and development of "firm" resources un-
der critical streamflow conditions to carry 75 percent of the total DSI re-
quirements. The balance [i.e., top quartile] would be served with resources
which are in excess of critical planning, amounts but operated to meet the
entire DSI load as if it were firm. The operation of the System to carry out
this purpose results from treating as a firm load the maximum amount of the
DSI load (not all of which can be covered under critical streamflow plan-
ning), to the extent that [(1)] this maximum load can be met in the initial
period of the PNW Coordination Agreement Critical Period while [(2)] pro-
tecting firm loads against the worst historical streamflow and [(3)] maintain-
ing an ability to restrict an equivalent amount of the DSI loads in the later
periods (without provisional or advance energy being made available for
this amount of the DIS [sic] load). Further, in actual operation DSI power
withdrawn or curtailed in excess of interruptions for critical streamflows
would be replaced by power purchased by BPA on a short-term basis, if
available. The projected amounts estimated for the purposes of this analysis
[i.e., the eighty-five to ninety-six percent estimates] recognize the currently
projected resource deficits. However, it assumes that by 1985 under the pro-
posed legislation the System would be in load/resource balance. 123
This explanation covers several points. It describes combination ser-
vice with nonfirm energy 24 ("resources which are in excess of critical
planning amounts") and shifted FELCC; the amount of and security for
the shift are described in the clauses with the bracketed numbers added. It
also describes BPA's obligation to replace through short term purchases
DSI power "withdrawn or curtailed in excess of interruptions for critical
streamflows";125 this obligation demonstrates, including to the Corps,
U.S.C. §§ 839c(a), 839g(c) (Supp. V 1981). In the Senate Committee bill, the provision that is now
section 5(g)(7) of the Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839c(g)(7), was actually included twice, once with reference
to the required DSI contracts only. S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1979) (section 5(c)(1));
id. at 12 (section 9(c)(2)).
122. 20 RATES RECORD, supra note 7, at 11213-34 (Feb. 1979 analysis).
123. S. REP. No. 272,96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59(1979).
124. Id.
125. Id. To act consistently with this stated obligation, BPA must replace with purchased energy
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that BPA, too, will serve the top quartile as firm except when critical
streamflows make this impossible. And it projects the expected average
availability of power through combination service to be eighty-five to
ninety-six percent under conditions of regional load/resource balance-
conditions assumed from 1985 onward.
The Senate report and two House reports each described the intended
service for the full DSI load, the intended restriction rights for each quar-
tile, and the intended use of such restrictions to protect firm loads, not
utility nonfirm purchases.1 26 That BPA would obtain, through combina-
tion service, four quartiles of DSI power sales revenues while incurring
only three quartiles of firm power resource costs in serving the DSIs was
also recognized as an economy that would help make possible the rate
benefits the legislation contemplated for BPA's other customers. 127
In mid-1980, the Water and Power Subcommittee asked BPA to ana-
lyze DSI service under the bill; BPA replied in August 1980.128 When the
full Interior Committee acted, its report incorporated verbatim BPA's de-
scription of DSI service, adding only the introductory clause:
The Committee understands and intends that the new DSI contracts under
the legislation will provide capacity reserves .... The DSIs will also pro-
vide two types of energy reserves. Approximately 25 percent of the DSI
load is to be treated as a firm load for purposes of resource operation and
will provide an operating reserve that may be restricted by BPA at any time
in order to protect the Administrator's firm loads within the region and for
any reason, including low or critical streamflow conditions and unantici-
pated growth of regional firm loads. An additional 25 percent (the second
quartile) of the DSI load will be treated as a firm load for both planning and
operating purposes and will provide a planning reserve to protect the Ad-
ministrator's firm loads against the delayed completion or unexpectedly
poor performance of regional generating resources or conservation mea-
sures implemented or acquired by BPA. 129
Senators Jackson and McClure, then chairman and ranking minority
member of the Senate Energy Committee, each affirmed at final Senate
passage that the cited language from the House Interior Committee report
any energy not delivered to the DSIs because of the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Central Lincoln Peoples'
Util. Dist. v. Johnson, 686 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussed in part IV infra).
126. See, e.g., S. REP No 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 23, 28, 59 (1979): H.R. REP No 976,
Part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29, 52, 61-63 (1980).
127. See generally Kazen letter, supra note 7: S. REP No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 59. 56-79
(1979).
128. Kazen letter, supra note 7.
129. H.R. REP. No 976, Part II. 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1980). The language is taken from
Appendix III of the the Kazen letter, supra note 7.
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represented thie understanding and intent of the Senate committee as
well. 130
IV. CENTRAL LINCOLN I AND THE FUTURE OF COMBINATION
SERVICE
The Act became law on December 5, 1980. On August 28, 1981,
within the nine-month deadline established in the Act, 131 BPA offered all
customers new power sales contracts. The language from the House Inte-
rior Committee report set forth above was incorporated into the new DSI
contracts as section 7(c), governing BPA's top quartile power supply ob-
ligations and restriction rights. A few days after the contracts were of-
fered, several publicly owned utilities (BPA preference customers) filed
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit a challenge to the
lawfulness of section 7(c) and three related provisions of the new DSI
contracts. 132
The challenged contract provisions each permit BPA to restrict deliver-
ies to the DSI top quartile "at any time for any reason in order to protect
Bonneville's ability to meet" its firm loads, but prohibit such restrictions
for the purpose of permitting BPA to sell nonfirm energy to utilities. The
utilities alleged, inter alia, that these provisions violated the preference
clause by effectively denying public bodies and cooperatives priority in
the sale of BPA nonfirm energy.
The Ninth Circuit ultimately held that in the absence of clear direction
from Congress the preference clause requires BPA to offer nonfirm en-
ergy to preference utilities before supplying it to the DSI top quartile. 133
The court specifically acknowledged, however, that Congress intended
BPA to use shifted FELCC for top quartile service. 134
In effect, Central Lincoln I thus diminishes, to an uncertain extent, the
availability of the nonfirm energy component of combination service
while securing the availability of the borrowed firm component. Because
the usefulness of either component depends in part on the availability of
the other, however, the impact of Central Lincoln I on combination ser-
vice certainly exceeds its impact on the availability to the DSIs of the
nonfirm energy component alone.
130. 126 CONG. REc. S14691, S 14698 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1980). That this was in fact the case is
indicated by the Senate Report, which noted with respect to the definition of "reserves" that "[i]t is
not intended that the Administrator's reserves will be used to protect other than firm loads." S. REP.
No. 272, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 23 (1979).
131. Northwest Power Act, supra note 68, § 5(g)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 839c(g)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
132. Central Lincoln People's Util. Dist. v. Johnson, 686 F.2d 708, 710 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1983) (No. 82-1071).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 713 n.7.
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This is not, perhaps, an appropriate time or place to analyze the reason-
ing in Central Lincoln I or to speculate about the ultimate impacts of the
decision if it stands. 135 Nor is Central Lincoln I the only threat to combi-
nation service. One irony of the Act is that by diversifying regional power
planning and opening the planning process to expanded public participa-
tion and debate, the Act has itself encouraged renewed argument on spe-
cific power policy questions it was designed in part to answer. In the bro-
adest sense, combination service presents just such a continuing policy
question, even if the Act is seen as answering that question for the imme-
diate future.
No law, no contract, and no judicial decision can secure such a com-
plex concept completely; it will always be subject to erosion through doz-
ens of small and seemingly unrelated policy decisions. This article re-
flects a belief that if combination service were more widely understood
and its benefits more widely recognized, its future would be more secure.
The belief may be wrong; it may be biased; it is unlikely to be tested. If
combination service dies, it is likely to die in the dark. The region will no
longer minimize the resources it needs to carry its loads, but not because
it chose not to: because it never knew it could.
135. The author argued the case for the DSIs before the Ninth Circuit. On December 23. 1982.
the DSIs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in the case, with the author as one of the
lawyers on the petition. Certiorari was granted on March 25. 1983. 51 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. Mar.
25. 1983) (No. 82-1071).
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